#action, #syscall, arg_cnt, #__VA_ARGS__); \
} \
while (false)
+#define RULE0(action, syscall) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ int status = seccomp_rule_add (ctx, action, syscall, 0); \
+ if (status < 0) \
+ fail (-status, "seccomp_rule_add (%s, %s, 0)", \
+ #action, #syscall); \
+ } \
+ while (false)
static void
export_filter (const char *file,
assert ((uintptr_t) NULL == 0);
/* Allow a clean exit. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (exit));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (exit_group));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (exit));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (exit_group));
/* Allow `mmap' and friends. This is necessary for dynamic loading,
reading the portable dump file, and thread creation. We don't
~(MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED
| MAP_DENYWRITE),
0));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (munmap));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (munmap));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (mprotect),
/* Don't allow making pages executable. */
SCMP_A2_32 (SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ,
~(PROT_NONE | PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE), 0));
/* Allow restartable sequences. The dynamic linker uses them. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (rseq));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (rseq));
/* Futexes are used everywhere. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (futex),
SCMP_A1_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE));
/* Allow basic dynamic memory management. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (brk));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (brk));
/* Allow some status inquiries. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (uname));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getuid));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (geteuid));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getpid));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (gettid));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getpgrp));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (uname));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getuid));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (geteuid));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getpid));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (gettid));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getpgrp));
/* Allow operations on open file descriptors. File descriptors are
capabilities, and operating on them shouldn't cause security
issues. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (read));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (pread64));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (write));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (close));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (lseek));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (dup));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (dup2));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (fstat));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (read));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (pread64));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (write));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (close));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (lseek));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (dup));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (dup2));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (fstat));
/* Allow read operations on the filesystem. If necessary, these
should be further restricted using mount namespaces. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (access));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (faccessat));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (access));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (faccessat));
#ifdef __NR_faccessat2
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (faccessat2));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (faccessat2));
#endif
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (stat));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (stat64));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (lstat));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (lstat64));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (fstatat64));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (newfstatat));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (readlink));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (readlinkat));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getcwd));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (stat));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (stat64));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (lstat));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (lstat64));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (fstatat64));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (newfstatat));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (readlink));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (readlinkat));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getcwd));
/* Allow opening files, assuming they are only opened for
reading. */
SCMP_A1_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_GETFL));
/* Allow reading random numbers from the kernel. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getrandom));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getrandom));
/* Changing the umask is uncritical. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (umask));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (umask));
/* Allow creation of pipes. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (pipe));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (pipe2));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (pipe));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (pipe2));
/* Allow reading (but not changing) resource limits. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getrlimit));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (getrlimit));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (prlimit64),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0) /* pid == 0 (current process) */,
SCMP_A2_64 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0) /* new_limit == NULL */);
SCMP_A2_64 (SCMP_CMP_NE, 0) /* new_limit != NULL */);
/* Emacs installs signal handlers, which is harmless. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (sigaction));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (rt_sigaction));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (sigprocmask));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (rt_sigprocmask));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (sigaction));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (rt_sigaction));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (sigprocmask));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (rt_sigprocmask));
/* Allow reading the current time. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (clock_gettime),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, CLOCK_REALTIME));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (time));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (gettimeofday));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (time));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (gettimeofday));
/* Allow timer support. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (timer_create));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (timerfd_create));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (timer_create));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (timerfd_create));
/* Allow thread creation. See the NOTES section in the manual page
for the `clone' function. */
| CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID),
0));
/* glibc 2.34+ pthread_create uses clone3. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (clone3));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (sigaltstack));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (set_robust_list));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (clone3));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (sigaltstack));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (set_robust_list));
/* Allow setting the process name for new threads. */
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (prctl),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_SET_NAME));
/* Allow some event handling functions used by glib. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (eventfd));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (eventfd2));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (wait4));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (poll));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (eventfd));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (eventfd2));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (wait4));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (poll));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (pidfd_open),
SCMP_A1_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0));
/* Don't allow creating sockets (network access would be extremely
dangerous), but also don't crash. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EACCES), SCMP_SYS (socket));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EACCES), SCMP_SYS (socket));
EXPORT_FILTER (argv[1], seccomp_export_bpf);
EXPORT_FILTER (argv[2], seccomp_export_pfc);
calls. Firstly, the wrapper binary will need to `execve' the
Emacs binary. Furthermore, the C library requires some system
calls at startup time to set up thread-local storage. */
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (execve));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (set_tid_address));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (execve));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (set_tid_address));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EINVAL), SCMP_SYS (prctl),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_CAPBSET_READ));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (arch_prctl),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, ARCH_SET_FS));
RULE (SCMP_ACT_ERRNO (EINVAL), SCMP_SYS (arch_prctl),
SCMP_A0_32 (SCMP_CMP_EQ, ARCH_CET_STATUS));
- RULE (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (statfs));
+ RULE0 (SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS (statfs));
/* We want to allow starting the Emacs binary itself with the
--seccomp flag, so we need to allow the `prctl' and `seccomp'